

The Need for Security Clearance Procedures

A very real need exists for security clearance procedures which will protect the viability of sensitive intelligence information received both by members of intelligence agencies and by individuals who, in the course of their duties, have access to such information. Soviet and other hostile intelligence services assign overriding priority to penetrating U.S. intelligence organizations by identifying and exploiting personal vulnerabilities and weaknesses of their personnel. Such penetration can enable the opposition to identify and neutralize our own intelligence operations; learn what we know and what we don't know about opposition capabilities and intentions; gain insights enabling the opposition to confuse and deceive us; and provide vital information regarding U.S. national policy, military capabilities, technology, and intentions with which intelligence and other governmental personnel become familiar in the course of their routine work.

The United States Government and the Intelligence Community have, in past years, established a series of guidelines which are the basis for all security clearance procedures. Individuals who have access to classified information are investigated and cleared under the standards set forth in the Act of August 26, 1950, Stat. 476; Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947; the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended; and Executive Orders No. 10450 of April 27, 1953, as amended, No. 10491 of October 13, 1953, as amended, and No. 10501 of November 5, 1953, as amended. The checks and balances set forth in these statutes and regulations are designed to benefit both the applicant for U.S. Government employment and the interests of the U.S. Government.

In addition to the foregoing which applies to individuals receiving security clearances in agencies of the U.S. Government, the Intelligence Community has established clearance procedures relating to individuals who have access to compartmented information. Security requirements in this area stem from a Directive of Central Intelligence Directive which established uniform personnel security standards for individuals having access to compartmented information.

This Directive clearly establishes the personnel security standards and minimum investigative criteria to be met by all United States Government civilian and military personnel, government consultants and employees of government contractors, who require access to sensitive compartmented information or to information which reveals the manner, methods and operational details by which sensitive compartmented information is collected.

In order to comply with the statutes and regulations heretofore mentioned, it is necessary to conduct comprehensive investigations of individuals who have access to classified information, in order to establish their bona-fides and a pattern of continuity in their lives which will clearly indicate that they are who they claim to be. Additionally, as required by these statutes and regulations, such investigations establish the unquestioned and undivided loyalty of these individuals to the United States and establish that they are stable and of excellent character and discretion. Such investigations are designed to present a careful and thorough assessment of the individual to ensure the selection of the right man for the job. This is essential not only in the interests of the individual agencies and the government, but in those of the individual as well. Many people, through no fault of their own, are subject to latent weaknesses and vulnerabilities of one sort or another, and it is believed that it would be a great disservice to them to impose upon them burdens for which they are unfitted, perhaps leading to unfortunate personal consequences as well as to serious security damage to the Government of the United States. The procedures in the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as in many other agencies of the Intelligence Community, for ensuring the security and suitability of its personnel have been developed over the years on the basis of specialized knowledge of the aims and methods of the opposition, the importance and sensitivity of the Agency's responsibilities, the best professional advice, and the cumulative practical experience of a number of years of management.

In conjunction with the development of strong personnel security programs, agencies of the United States Government have developed physical and technical security programs over the years. Although it is the

belief of this Agency that the strongest link in the security chain is the security of its personnel, the development of physical storage facilities to protect hard copy classified information and of technical capabilities to detect attempted audio penetrations of overseas installations are also important. Particularly in the overseas environment where opposition intelligence services may operate with a freer hand, the development and use of physical security safeguards such as safes, vaulted areas, perimeter lighting, military guards, and the like are vital to the protection of classified information.

Audio penetration finds have shown that the opposition continues to attempt to monitor the conversations of U.S. officials overseas. There have been a total of 450 incidents of hostile audio penetration reported by CIA, other U.S. Government agencies, and allied countries since 1945. These incidents involved the use of 1672 pieces of equipment or devices. It is therefore apparent that counter-audio devices be developed and utilized in an attempt to discover and neutralize such activities.

Lastly, it is necessary in all government organizations having intelligence responsibilities to develop counter-intelligence programs. Since it is known that opposition services attempt to penetrate United States Intelligence bodies through either physical means, through the co-opting of individuals already employed by these organizations, or by placing agents within such organizations on a long range basis, it is vital to the security of our governmental secrets that continuing programs be mounted to discover such facts as an extreme change in an individual's life style, indications that he or she has unaccounted for wealth, indications that the individual's stability has changed, indications that the individual is deeply in debt, or the like. Such indicators are established through systematic reinvestigation programs designed to assure both an agency and the individual of the individual's continued usefulness. The basic responsibilities for counter-intelligence work within the United States rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation if, in fact, information is developed during a reinvestigation which would indicate that the individual is cooperating with a foreign intelligence service.

In conclusion, it may be said that intelligence personnel and individuals who have access to intelligence information are not only an attractive target for the opposition services, but in many respects represent a particularly accessible one. Unlike members of most

government organizations, intelligence personnel often must carry out their demanding assignments completely alone and subject to severe psychological pressures. In these circumstances, any latent vulnerabilities and instabilities of character may come to the surface and be detected and exploited by an alert opposition. It is incumbent, therefore, for any organization dealing in intelligence matters to develop personnel, physical, technical, and counter-intelligence security programs in order to fully protect the Nation's secrets.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/08/21 : CIA-RDP83B00823R000900010024-9

Review Staff: 75/2266

Date 9 August 1975

TO : CIA Task Force

FROM : The Review Staff,

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SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request

RECEIVED: Date _____ Time _____

OS. Questions asked by the HSC members and staffers reflect serious misconceptions or apprehensions about intelligence work. Probably these views are representative of the general public understanding. We need to correct the worst of these in unclassified briefing papers written in laymen's terms that can be made available for the public record. Where necessary for full understanding, we can include a classified addendum to round out the information.

For example, Congressman Milford got into the area of Soviet penetration of Congress. (Testimony Pages 1181-1182) Mr. Colby explained our clearance, security, and counter-intelligence activities in very general terms. He noted that Congress well might be concerned with this issue in view of the large staffs it is beginning to establish. Please provide a paper setting forth both the need for and the types of precautions that could be taken.

Also, the HSC staff is concerned that the Audit Staff

Comments:

	Action	Info
SC/DCI		X
A/DDA	(X)	
A/DDI		
A/DDO		
A/DDS&T		
OGC		
OEC		
IG		

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makes exceptions to standards set by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and that these exceptions are not codified but exist only in the minds of auditors. They feel this is too pliable. While this judgment reflects their own inexperience, they will pursue this point with the members. Please provide a paper which shows the true effect of any inability on our part to follow strict standards.